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The Constitution has changed, how to change Italy?

The amendments to Articles 9 and 41 of the Italian Constitution on February 8, 2022, marked a pivotal shift in Italy’s approach to environmental protection and sustainable development. These recognised the importance of balancing economic and social progress with the protection of the environment, in the interests of both present and future generations. However, to develop and enhance their transformative potential, the new principles must be translated into concrete political guidelines that fully reflect the challenges facing today’s society. Among these, climate change stands out as one of the most urgent and complex. 

To commemorate the third anniversary of this constitutional reform, a special event titled The Constitution has changed, how to change Italy?” was held on February 21, 2025, at the Teatro Studio Gianni Borgna, Auditorium Parco della Musica in Rome. The event featured the presentation of an in-depth study, developed over the past year by ECCO and the Italian Alliance for Sustainable Development (ASvIS), exploring the impacts of the constitutional reform on the creation of climate-related public policies.  

During the event, the study was symbolically handed over to Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, the Minister for Institutional Reforms and Regulatory Simplification, by Enrico Giovannini, the Co-founder and Scientific Director of ASvIS, and Matteo Leonardi, the Co-founder and Director of ECCO. 

Read the study: “The climate in the constitution: the implications for public policy” (Italian only) 

 

The climate in the Italian Constitution: implications for public policy 

The study delves into the implications of the constitutional reform for climate policymaking, exploring the relationships between the new principles and other fundamental rights, as well as key aspects of decarbonisation. It offers a range of proposals, along with judicial and legislative tools, to guide public policymaking in this area.  

The collection of these results is presented in the study, through contributions from several authors, including Anna Finocchiaro, Cesare Pinelli, Andrea Ferrazzi, Francesco Tomasone and Lorenzo Carrozza. By addressing the issue from different perspectives, they shed light on the complexity and relevance of the constitutional reforms for Italy’s climate governance. 

A common thread linking these contributions is the intention to bring the reader closer to rediscovering the “meaning” of the new fundamental principles. In today’s climate of uncertainty –  where the objective challenges of the climate transition become entangled with vested interests and amplified by political manipulation,  the influence of social media and misinformation –  the principles of the Constitution redirect society’s attention back to the “why” and “how” of protecting the environment as a common good, rather than the “if” suggested by those with vested interests. 

The scale of the transformation required to combat climate change is such that it cannot be separated from a political and social will rooted in constitutional values. In this regard, the Constitution offers a solid ideal benchmark and a long-term political horizon to inform collective action. This horizon can only be opened and explored on the basis of the fundamental principles. Therein lies the strength and timeliness of the Constitution. 

Without an overarching framework capable of positively reconciling collective challenges with individual interests, climate goals – like constitutional amendments – risk being perceived as abstract concepts, disconnected from everyday reality, and thus from popular consensus and will. Therefore, these principles must be accompanied by a path of normative implementation to enable their full realisation. 

A second common element in the contributions is the challenge faced by legislators in incorporating the future into present-day decisions, an essential requirement for environmental protection and intergenerational rights. Where does this difficulty stem from? Two dimensions emerge from the texts. On one hand, there is the objective complexity of translating a global process at the national level, compounded by the weakening of multilateral processes. This occurs despite a clear international legal framework rooted in the principle of common but differentiated responsibility among states, as well as the identification by all countries party to the Paris Agreement to implement nationally determined contributions aimed at limiting global warming to below two degrees by the end of the century. 

On the other hand, there is a lack of a political and legislative practice capable of incorporating the future into present-day decision-making. Such practice requires not only political will to consider the future, as is now outlined in the Constitution, but also the adoption of governance tools by the various levels of government and social actors that are adequate for meeting the complexity of the challenge. These difficulties are further exacerbated by the absence of effective safeguards to ensure the independence of legislative choices from vested interests that seek to delay the transition and the move away from fossil fuels. 

Next steps 

A clear sign of the legislature’s commitment to implementing the new principles would be the approval of a Climate Law as a regulatory framework tool for defining the governance of the decarbonisation process. Such a law, similar to those already adopted by many European countries, should contain minimum guarantees for ensuring compliance with climate goals, such as the adoption of a carbon budget, alignment of policies with scientific scenarios and international commitments, and the establishment of an independent scientific council to assess the effectiveness of the strategy and the consistency of the legislative process. 

A second key element to consider is the adoption of practices that ensure, based on evidence showing that the future costs of climate change far outweigh the current costs of reducing emissions, a correlation between public spending and climate goals. The new programmatic budget framework must therefore be integrated with a public spending strategy that supports the decarbonisation process and the phase-out of fossil fuels, while also supporting the country’s competitiveness in global markets. Alongside this, there must be a strategy to develop a fiscal and parafiscal system that is consistent with climate goals, with effective rules for conditionality in public spending. Identifying resources for green markets, establishing connections with private finance, and defining rules to mitigate the risks of stranded costs in public investments and energy infrastructure regulation are also essential components. 

A third element concerns the adoption of monitoring tools, accountability, independence and participation in climate policymaking to ensure consistency with a vision of social and economic sustainability throughout the transition. It is essential to move beyond the use of societal difficulties as arguments for “if,” and instead activate a transition process through public policies that addresses the concrete needs of people, implementing decarbonisation into homes, transport and work.  

Finally, we must acknowledge that the individual referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution is not simply the Italian citizen and their interests, but humanity as a whole. This translates into the need for diplomatic action that supports the global goals set in Paris, aligning Italy’s international position with its constitutional principles. 

Read the study: “The climate in the constitution: the implications for public policy” (Italian only)

 

Photo from Pixabay 

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